Prof. Paul Rogers: Moving from Blair to Brown - June 2007

When Tony Blair came to power ten years ago, most of the emphasis of his new administration was on domestic issues. 'Education, education, education' was the mantra, but there was also an emphasis on the health service, devolution, and the prospects for peace in Northern Ireland. Beyond a commitment to the European Union and a determination to stay close to the United States, foreign and security policy did not figure greatly in his original plans.

There were two exceptions. One was an evident commitment to international development, leading to an immediate increase in the aid budget, and the other was a concern with the conflict in the Balkans, leading ultimately to a major military commitment in Kosovo. This was followed by another military involvement, this time in Sierra Leone in 2000, the two examples doing much to convince Mr Blair that Britain should be committed to 'liberal interventionism'. This involved the willingness to deploy troops to curb conflicts, especially in what were termed failed and failing states, but went it further, including an interest in peacekeeping and conflict prevention.

These policies were not greatly controversial, even if some analysts saw individual ventures as having more to do with Britain's foreign policy interests than with humanitarian motives, but the real change came with the response to the attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. This was very soon after Labour had been returned to power with another massive majority, and many of its supporters looked to a more radical focus on domestic issues, especially a programme for narrowing the wealth-poverty divide that had remained an intractable feature of the British economy for generations.

Instead, most of Mr Blair's remaining six years as Prime Minister have been dominated by his unqualified support for President Bush and his vigorous pursuit of the global war on terror. In spite of the intense controversy over the development of this war, it is worth remembering that there was not a great deal of opposition to the termination of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan immediately after 9/11.

The real change came in early 2002, when George Bush extended the war on terror. His State of the Union address in January 2002 depicted an 'axis of evil' involving Iraq, Iran and North Korea as being a key focus for that war, and his graduation address at the West Point military academy at the start of June spoke of the right of the United States to pre-empt threats to its security.

By mid 2002, Iraq was clearly in US sights and the Bush administration was greatly aided by the fulsome support of his closest ally, Tony Blair. By early 2003, war with Iraq seemed inevitable in spite of a massive anti-war movement that included one of the largest political demonstrations ever mounted in Britain. Even so, the war went ahead, with consequences that may determine the Blair legacy for decades to come.

In Iraq, four years on, over 100,000 civilians have been killed and nearly four million people are now refugees, either displaced in Iraq or forced out to neighbouring countries. US forces have lost over 3,300 people killed and 24,000 injured and April was the worst month for British troops in Iraq since the war began over four years ago. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, a Taliban revival is under way, with daily violence; furthermore, some districts of western Pakistan are controlled by Taliban and al-Qaida militias.

Far from being defeated, the al-Qaida movement itself has actually been more active in the years since 9/11 than in an equivalent period before. Attacks in Indonesia, Pakistan, Morocco, Kenya, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Spain and Britain have been accompanied by a pronounced increase in anti-Americanism, especially across the Middle East. By inserting 150,000 soldiers into the heart of the region, the United States has done a remarkable service to the al-Qaida movement ¿ Osama bin Laden in his cave (or possibly his Karachi apartment) must be hugely satisfied.

In spite of all of these problems, and in spite of the electoral damage done to the Labour Party, Mr Blair remains absolutely convinced of the rightness of his support for George Bush. He sees it almost in a Manichean good-versus-evil picture and is determined to leave a legacy of a Britain punching above its weight in world affairs. His defence legacy speech on HMS Albion at Devonport last January made clear his commitment to 'hard power', and his administration has taken two major decisions to ensure Britain remains a significant military power.

In addition to the well-known plan to replace the Trident nuclear system, Britain is to build two massive aircraft carriers, the 65,000-tonne Queen Elizabeth-class warships, deployed with the hugely expensive US F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. These will be by far the largest warships ever to see service in the Royal Navy and will enable Britain to engage in expeditionary warfare, presumably alongside the United States, wherever thought necessary but most likely in the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

At the end of June, Gordon Brown will thus inherit a Britain committed to deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to a defence policy that has major interventionist capabilities. Both elements, though, come at a price. In Iraq and Afghanistan, that price includes people's lives as wall as financial costs, and in the new defence projects it means budgetary pressures for at least the next decade.

What will be significant is whether Mr Brown makes any major changes, and there are two things to watch for in the remainder of 2007. One is a speeding up of a withdrawal from Iraq. In defence circles, it is privately accepted that the withdrawal is in reality a retreat ¿ whatever 'spin' is put on it, Basra is controlled by militias, not the central government in Baghdad.

Mr Brown may well complete the withdrawal in a very few months, perhaps leaving a couple of thousand troops to help the United States guard supply routes towards Baghdad and thus enable Mr Bush to claim that there is still a coalition remaining in Iraq, however minimal.

The real indicator, though, is whether Mr Brown allows the plan for the new aircraft carriers to go forward. The final decision has not yet been taken and he could well decide against it on grounds of cost if nothing else.

More generally, though, what will be interesting is whether Mr Brown sees global security as an issue that goes well beyond traditional ideas of defence. There are some indications that he and his team believe that the major issues for the next couple of decades will be the consequences of climate change for a global system that remains deeply troubled by social and economic divisions. If that turns out to be the case, then 'Brownism' could be significantly different from the Blair era, perhaps more so than many people might expect.