

**Was Woodrow Wilson Right? Assessing American Attitudes towards
Humanitarian Intervention**

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One of the greatest challenges facing the international community today is responding to the demands of widespread suffering. The end of the Cold War brought new attention to humanitarian crises, underscoring the challenges posed by famine, disease, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide. In the 1990s, many nations began to respond to human suffering in other states, treading into new waters of military commitment in the name of humanitarianism. In some cases, the international community has acted under the auspices of the United Nations and dispatched peacekeepers to troubled areas. In a more controversial vein, the international community has also relied upon humanitarian military intervention, using military force to end massive human suffering.² In 1992, the United States was at the forefront of this latter trend, as Bush initiated humanitarian intervention in Somalia, and Clinton committed more US troops in the name of human rights protection than any other administration in US history.³ In the eyes of many, the time had come to make Woodrow Wilson's words the hallmark of international engagement: "All shall know that America puts human rights above all other rights, and that her flag is the flag not only of America but of humanity."⁴

While the US has greatly expanded the scope of its intervention, several high profile humanitarian crises have slipped through the cracks. One of the most glaring examples is the

² Humanitarian intervention refers to the use of military force, without the consent of a government, for the purpose of ending massive human suffering. Humanitarian interventions usually bypass a state's sovereignty and involve a considerable use of force. These two aspects render them much more controversial than peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping refers to typically multilateral operations that monitor cease-fires, patrol buffer zones, assist in civil administration, promote the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and separate and demobilise combatants. Generally, peacekeeping involves lightly armed forces who are invited into a country to oversee an armistice agreement or the distribution of relief aid.

³ Most notably in the cases of Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

⁴ Woodrow Wilson, Address at Independence Hall, Philadelphia (July 4, 1914).

American neglect to intervene in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. More recently, the Darfur region of Sudan has witnessed an estimated 400,000 deaths and four million refugees, and nearby in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there are four million deaths from famine and violence.

Today, evidence from the outskirts of Mogadishu, Somalia indicates that the refugee crisis caused by warring clans in the capital city could potentially eclipse the crisis in Darfur, particularly given the scarcity of international engagement.⁵ These cases represent the reluctance of the United States, along with other great powers, to address several pressing humanitarian crises.

Public opinion is frequently the scapegoat for such inaction.⁶ For example, low public support has been blamed for crippling operations in Rwanda in 1994.⁷ Several policy makers have noted that public support can be an important factor in countries' original commitments to such interventions, as well as their resilience.⁸ Domestic public awareness and support may influence policy elites' desire, willingness, and commitment to respond to such widespread suffering. Recently, several scholars have highlighted the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, noting, "a mounting body of evidence suggests that the foreign policies of American presidents—and democratic leaders more generally—have been influenced by their understanding

⁵ Jeffrey Gettleman, "As Somali Crisis Swells, Experts See a Void in Aid " *The New York Times*, November 20, 2007: A1.

⁶ Pierre Martin and Michel Fortmann, "Public Opinion: Obstacle, Partner or Scapegoat?" *Policy Options*, January-February 2001, p. 66-72.

"Interview with General Romeo Dallaire," Kennedy School Bulletin, autumn, 2005

<http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ksgpress/bulletin/autumn2005/charles/lessons.htm>, last accessed 2 February 2009.

⁷ Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁸See: Caspar W. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace* (New York: Warner Books, 1992) p. 442; European Security and Defense Assembly "The Public Response to International Military Operations" Recommendation 828 Adopted by the Assembly on December 3, 2008, 2nd sitting; Bruce Russett, *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990).

of the public's foreign policy views.”⁹ Thus, a sympathetic public may push its leaders to intervene in troubled areas. In contrast, an unsupportive population might lessen political support, block monetary commitments, and enhance overall ‘collective reluctance.’¹⁰

Given the potential impact of public opinion, it is important to study its determinants. What leads the general public to support the creation of a humanitarian operation? Are Wilsonian ideals persuasive? To answer these questions, we examine the case of Kosovo. This year marks the tenth anniversary of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, a controversial operation that captured the attention of the public. This paper uses the case of Kosovo to initiate a theory building exercise to identify the factors that influence public views of humanitarian intervention. Scholars have identified several factors that appear influential, highlighting the importance of risk assessment, elite cues, and media coverage in particular. We examine the ability of these variables to predict public support for humanitarian operations. In addition, we present an additional variable that merits closer scrutiny – the historical milieu, or a nation's recent experience with a peacekeeping operation or a humanitarian intervention. This last variable explores how recent success might create a “halo” around current and future missions, and a recent disaster may create a “hangover,” leading the public to be wary of future involvement.¹¹

Our analysis focuses on American attitudes towards humanitarian intervention. Given the critical role the US plays in providing financial support and leadership for humanitarian

⁹ John H. Aldrich et al., "Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (2006): 477-502. 496. For additional reviews of the relationship between American public opinion and US foreign policy, see Adam J. Berinsky, "Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict," *The Journal of Politics* 69, 4 (2007): 975–97, Douglas Foyle, "Foreign Policy Analysis and Globalization: Public Opinion, World Opinion, and the Individual," *International Studies Review* 5, 2 (2003): 155–202.

¹⁰ Jan Van Der Meulen and Joseph Soeters, “Considering Casualties: Risk and Loss during Peacekeeping and Warmaking,” *Armed Forces and Society* 31, 4 (2005) 483.

¹¹ Alynna Lyon and Chris Dolan, "American Humanitarian Intervention: Toward a Theory of Coevolution," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2, 1 (2007): 46-78.

interventions, American attitudes towards such operations most certainly warrant closer examination. The United States, despite its recent tumultuous relationship with the United Nations, remains the top financial contributor to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. It supplies 26% of the operational budget – more than three times the contributions of the second and third place donors, Japan and Germany.¹² It is safe to say that United Nations' peacekeeping operations would be crippled without the support of the United States.¹³ In addition, as the United States played a key leadership role in most of the humanitarian interventions of the last two decades, it is unlikely that humanitarian interventions will get off the ground without US backing.¹⁴ Our goal is to identify the factors that explain public support for humanitarian intervention in the US; the cross-national test of these findings promises to be a fruitful venue for future research.

Our analysis proceeds in four parts. First, we provide a brief overview of our case study, followed by a review of the literature. We then test the hypotheses generated by the literature using bivariate and multivariate analysis.¹⁵ Finally, we explore how a study on the factors that influenced support for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo may be applied to understanding the

¹² Japan and Germany fall a distant second and third respectively, contributing approximately seven percent of the peacekeeping budget each (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf>). There has been a recent reduction in the US contribution to the peacekeeping budget. Prior to 2000, the US was assessed at a thirty per cent assessment rate. It is important to note that US troop contributions are relatively minor by design. Great powers are discouraged from troop contributions to peacekeeping operations.

¹³ In fact, recent reductions have led some to claim that peacekeeping is facing a potential financial crisis. See Peter H. Gantz and Katherine Andrews. "United Nations Peacekeeping: US Passing up a National Security Bargain" *Refugees International* (2006), <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/8231>

¹⁴ These include Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq (1991), Operation Restore Hope in Somalia (1992), Stability Force (SFOR) in the Former Yugoslavia (1992), Haiti (1994-7), and Kosovo (1999).

¹⁵ Since we aim to identify the determinants of public support for humanitarian engagement, our methodology consists of a quantitative analysis of individual level survey data. We use binomial logistic regression to model quantitatively the variables that best explain public support for the Kosovo operation.

building blocks of public support for similar commitments in places like Sudan and The Democratic Republic of Congo.

Humanitarian Intervention, the American Public, and Kosovo

Several factors make Kosovo an important case for understanding the variables that lead to public support. First, the operation was a humanitarian intervention that bypassed the legal parameters of sovereignty, initially evaded the legitimacy of United Nations authorisation, and relinquished any claim to neutrality and non-use of force. In addition, it is helpful to examine a case prior to 9/11, in which the dispatch of troops is not conflated with the United States' global fight against terrorism. Moreover, American public opinion featured prominently in the Kosovo operations. From early 1998 to June 1999, the Kosovo situation generated a significant debate within the United States as well as other Western governments. Discussions that began in policy sectors extended to society as both American politicians and the public questioned the morality, utility, and methods of engagement. In contrast to many other areas of foreign policy, the situation in Kosovo was highly salient to the public. Indeed, surveys indicated that 43% of respondents reported that they followed the situation in Kosovo somewhat closely, and almost 30% said they followed it very closely.¹⁶ Media coverage of the developments in Kosovo was extensive and provided significant information to the American public. Furthermore, the content of the media coverage included information on motivation for involvement, such as issues of morality and obligation, national interest and tactical concerns.

In addition to higher levels of public awareness, Kosovo is distinct due to politicians' receptivity to public concerns. Indeed, President Clinton was notorious for his consultation of

¹⁶Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) survey, May 13-17, 1999.

public opinion polls when weighing policy matters, and it is clear that the tactics chosen (i.e., a bombing campaign rather than ground forces) were part of a deliberate attempt to avoid a public backlash fueled by anger over casualties. As Everts notes:

The decision of the NATO allies to rely on air power alone . . . was, among other things, motivated by an assumption or perception that public opinion would not support a war in which the risk of military casualties on the allied side was anything but minimal.¹⁷

Kosovo also provides some interesting variation in terms of elite cues and policy objectives. Political elites disagreed sharply over the decision to intervene in Kosovo, giving the public mixed messages regarding the efficacy and necessity of American involvement. Furthermore, the policy objectives of the Kosovo intervention were mixed. The Clinton administration framed the mission primarily in humanitarian terms, envisioning it as “the first of a new kind of international use of force, not aimed at protecting or furthering traditional national interests, but at protecting people and their fundamental rights.”¹⁸ At the same time, there was a strategic component to American involvement as well. European allies were concerned about the geopolitical stability of their own backyard, and pressured the US to demonstrate that NATO was not an antiquated Cold War relic; it could be used effectively in the post-Cold War era to promote stability.

Finally, the case of Kosovo is well situated for examining the impact of historical milieu, in this case a nation’s prior experience with humanitarian engagement. As this paper focuses on the impact of a nation’s prior experience, we aim to examine public support for Kosovo in light of the United States’ past experiences with humanitarian operations. The Kosovo intervention came on

¹⁷ Everts, "Introduction." 1.

¹⁸ Philip Everts, "War without Bloodshed? Public Opinion and the Conflict over Kosovo," in *Public Opinion and the International Use of Force*, ed. Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia (New York: Routledge, 2001).

the heels of a few missions of dubious success, perhaps most infamously the debacle in Somalia in 1991 and 1992. Of particular interest in our study is prior US involvement in neighboring Bosnia in 1995. Given the geographical proximity of Bosnia, and the involvement of many of the same actors, it seems that if historical milieu does indeed influence support for later operations, we should see some connection between assessments of the Bosnia mission and support for that of Kosovo.

The Context of the US Intervention into Kosovo

Kosovo was initially slow to appear on the American radar as operations in Bosnia monopolised policymakers' focus. Yet, in the aftermath of the Yugoslav civil war, tensions in the Kosovo region of Serbia escalated. Nationalist sentiments flared in this region, as struggles between ethnic Serbs, Croats, and Albanians mirrored events in the other former Yugoslav Republics. By late 1998, reports of civilians massacred by an organised Serbian military initiatives brought Kosovo into the world's view. Despite warnings and sanctions from the international community, Slobodan Milosevic, the appointed President of Serbia, refused to restrain the escalating violence. In response to Milosevic's defiance, the United States led NATO in a massive air campaign against Yugoslavia on March 25, 1999. President Bill Clinton asserted that the United States had a "moral imperative" to protect the ethnic Albanians from the wrath of a nationalist regime and to contain the horrors of ethnic conflict.¹⁹ NATO's campaign, lasting eleven weeks, included 1000 planes and over 14,000 explosive shells.²⁰ To minimise the threat of military casualties during the bombing campaign, the aircraft flew above 15,000 feet and bombed for 78 days. A marine colonel claimed at the time that the US "sent the strongest possible signal

¹⁹ Jeffrey Fleishman and Lori Montgomery, "NATO, Yugoslavia 'at the Brink'," *The State*, 23 March 1999.

²⁰ David Fromkin, *Kosovo Crossing* (New York: The Free Press, 1999).

that while it is willing to conduct military operations in situations not vital to the country's interests, it is not willing to put in harm's way the means necessary to conduct these operations effectively and conclusively."²¹

After Serbia accepted a peace plan on June 3, 1999, and the Serbian military withdrew, NATO ceased its air campaign and established the cooperative peacekeeping mission KFOR. On June 12, 1999, NATO implemented a peace plan, allowing KFOR to enter Kosovo. The United Nations soon followed with UNMIK. According to the peace accords, both UN and NATO peacekeepers were charged with assisting refugee return, stabilising Kosovo's multiethnic society and normalising the political environment.

Overall, the American public was in favor of US action in Kosovo. While support for air strikes was tepid in early March, a majority supported the dispatch of ground troops to enforce a peace treaty.²² Once NATO actually began its air campaign, the American public did exhibit a 'rally around the flag' tendency, with over 70% of the public in favour of air strikes.²³ Public support for the air campaign remained high throughout April, and the majority of the public indicated that they would support sending ground troops if the air campaign was unsuccessful. The week after Serbia accepted the peace plan, the majority of Americans were supportive of UN peacekeeping forces. Almost a year later in April 2000, support for the operation dipped slightly; still, 60% of the American public supported the mission.²⁴

²¹ "What Will America Risk?," *The Wilson Quarterly* 24, 4 (2000): 97.

²² According to the 1999 ABC News' *Nightline Kosovo Polls*, as of March 11, 30% of the public favoured airstrikes, but 55% supported the dispatch of ground troops to enforce a peace treaty. ABC News. "Nightline Kosovo Polls, March-June 1999 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Horsham, PA: Chilton Research Services [producer], 1999. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll. April, Wave 1, 2000.

Public support for Kosovo operations indicated that Americans were willing to commit military forces and finances for humanitarian intervention. What factors explain this level of public support? Were Americans swayed by President Clinton's appeal to morality? Did the press coverage matter? To answer these questions, we turn to a review of the literature on public opinion and peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention.

Factors Influencing Public Attitudes towards Humanitarian Engagement

The literature on public opinion and foreign affairs is vast, yet we know substantially less about public opinion specific to United Nations or NATO humanitarian engagements. Still, the broader literature on public opinion and foreign policy illuminates several variables that theoretically appear to influence public attitudes towards humanitarian intervention: policy objectives, elite cues, media coverage, and risk assessment. We argue that in addition to these variables, one must also examine a nation's prior experience with humanitarian missions to predict attitudes towards current missions. We hold that the historical context of previous operations may be a significant determinant of attitudes about future operations. We conceptualise this as a historical milieu where "previous events shape and inform the public and policy elite consciousness."²⁵ Perceptions of previous engagements may act as a prism that shapes and informs public attitudes about humanitarianism.

Table 1 provides an overview of these theories and their components. To examine the impact of historical milieu, and test it alongside other variables featured prominently in the literature, we rely upon public opinion data collected May 13-17, 1999, by the Program on

²⁵ Lyon and Dolan, "American Humanitarian Intervention," 50.

International Policy Attitudes (PIPA).²⁶ PIPA designed this survey to gauge American views of the 1999 humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, conducting it six weeks after NATO air strikes began. Thus, this dataset provides for the ready operationalisation and measurement of the variables of interest in this study. We turn now to a discussion of the theoretical importance, as well as our measurement, of each of these variables.

Policy Objectives

In a seminal piece, Jentleson and Britton provide compelling evidence that the principal policy objective of an intervention has a significant impact on public support for that intervention. They identify three types of principal policy objectives: foreign policy restraint, internal political changes, and humanitarian intervention.²⁷ Following their argument, if an operation is viewed as vital to the national interest, the public will be more supportive of such a mission. However, the public also views military missions with humanitarian goals quite favorably. Jentleson and Britton found that when humanitarian concerns triggered military interventions, Americans were strikingly supportive, with 75% in favour of them.²⁸ This stands in marked contrast to those operations targeting internal political change, for which Americans registered the lowest levels of public support.²⁹

To test this theory, we rely upon two survey items that gauge public perceptions of policy objectives in Kosovo. One survey question measures the perception that humanitarian concerns

²⁶ PIPA, *Americans on Kosovo*, May 13-17, 1999. We would like to thank PIPA for providing the dataset used for this study.

²⁷ Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, 4 (1998): 395-417.

²⁸ Kull reports similar findings, as he reports that 66% of Americans supported US troop commitment to UN peacekeeping operations even in cases where there were no strategic interests. Steven Kull, "The U.S. Public Isn't Averse to Peacekeeping," *Christian Science Monitor* 87, 144 (1995): 19.

²⁹ Jentleson and Britton, "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force." 402.

drove the Kosovo intervention, while the other focuses on the perception of the strategic value of the mission. While we would ideally like to include a measure of internal political change, as highlighted by Jentleson and Britton, unfortunately our dataset did not contain a corresponding survey question. Still, the data do allow for the ready operationalisation of two crucial policy objectives, allowing us to formulate the following hypotheses:

H₁: Respondents who view the intervention in humanitarian terms will be more supportive of the commitment of forces than those who do not.

H₂: Respondents who perceive a strategic interest in Kosovo will be more supportive of humanitarian interventions than those who do not.

H₃: The perception of strategic interest will have a greater effect on support for humanitarian interventions than the perception of moral obligation.

We first test these hypotheses at the bivariate level. We gauge respondents' assessment of the humanitarian imperative to intervene in Kosovo through the following survey item: "*The Serbs' effort at "ethnic cleansing" through killing many ethnic Albanians and driving hundreds of thousands of them out of Kosovo is a form of genocide. The US has a moral obligation to join in efforts to stop this genocide.*" Respondents were asked to state if they found this statement (1) convincing or (0) not convincing. As Figure 1 illustrates, at the bivariate level there is a significant relationship between this measure of humanitarian perception and the dependent variable, public support for peacekeeping forces.³⁰ Consistent with Jentleson and Britton's thesis, Americans who thought that the US had a moral obligation to intervene were significantly more likely to support peacekeeping efforts.

³⁰ In this graph (as well as all subsequent graphs), the dependent variable is measured through the following survey question: "*Some people feel that NATO should send ground troops into Kosovo at this point. Do you favor or oppose this idea? (1) favor; (0) oppose.*" It is important to remember that respondents answered this survey question approximately six weeks after the bombing campaign was initiated and approximately one month prior to the peace accords.

To test the second hypothesis, we now turn to respondents' views of the strategic importance of Kosovo operations, relying upon another survey item: "*Kosovo is far from the US and we have no real interests there. Therefore it is wrong to risk the lives of American soldiers in a NATO operation there.*" Respondents were asked to state if they found this statement (1) convincing or (0) not convincing. As Figure 2 illustrates, at the bivariate level, there was a significant relationship between strategic interest and support for peacekeepers, yet the magnitude of this relationship was smaller than that found between support for peacekeepers and humanitarian policy objectives. The percentage difference between those who found moral arguments convincing and not convincing was 27%, while the percentage difference between respondents who found strategic interests convincing and not convincing was 21%. Also, the statistical relationship in Figure 1 is much stronger ($p < .001$) than in Figure 2 ($p < .05$). Thus, at the bivariate level we find some support for H_1 and H_2 , yet not for H_3 . In the case of Kosovo, it appears that humanitarian concerns promoted greater support for engagement than strategic ones.

Elite Cues

Extant literature suggests that policy makers provide cues to the public about goal preference and obligations in the general conduct of foreign policy.³¹ As Boulding points out, it is not the “objective” components of a situation, but the “image of the situation that is effective.”³² In the US, the most significant opinion leader in the realm of foreign policy is the president. Given the prominence of the president, it is logical to surmise that either approval of the president and/or identification with his party might influence public opinion of peacekeeping operations. The president’s endorsement of a mission might sway members of the public to support a given cause, as they approve of the president and/or his party. In the case of Kosovo, given President Clinton’s public statements in favour of NATO intervention, we would expect self-identifying Democrats to be more supportive of humanitarian operations.³³ For instance, on March 24, 1999 he proclaimed:

We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war, to defuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results. We act to stand united with our allies for peace. By acting now, we are upholding our values, protecting our interests, and upholding the cause of peace.³⁴

³¹ See Berinsky, "Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict.", Elihu Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 21 (1957): 61-78.; Russell W. Newman, *The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986). Philip J. Powlick and Andrew Z. Katz, "Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus," *Mershon International Studies Review* 42 (1998): 29-94.

³² Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3 (1959): 120-31.

³³ At the same time, it is important to note that a widely covered impeachment proceedings and a trial by the U.S. Senate had concluded only weeks before the Kosovo operations. These events may have diminished the “trust” in the President and decreased the influence of President Clinton’s cues to the American public.

³⁴ William Clinton, "Statement by the President to the Nation," March 24 1999.

At the same time, many Republicans were very vocal in their opposition of the Kosovo operation both before and during the bombing campaign as well as the operations that followed. For example, Senator John McCain remarked on CNN:

They (the administration) have not made the case either to the Congress or to the American people, and the president has to explain why our interests are there, what is going to happen, especially -- I believe we must tell the American people that any ground troops or peace keeping force has to be European and not U.S., and I think also these air strikes have to be very sufficient.³⁵

This lack of elite consensus provides the public with viable political alternatives; when elites disagree publicly, the citizens have access to more viewpoints as well as policy options. As Berinsky notes, "when political elites disagree as to the wisdom of intervention, the public divides as well. But when elites come to a common interpretation of a political reality, the public gives them great latitude to wage war."³⁶

To test the impact of elite cues, ideally we would like to include a measure of approval of President Clinton as well as leading members of the opposition. Such a measure is not available in the PIPA survey; however, there is a suitable proxy – identification with the President's party. If elite cues were to have an impact on support for peacekeeping in Kosovo, we would expect that greater identification with the President's party would lead to greater support for peacekeeping:

H₄: As identification with the Democratic Party increases, support for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo will also increase.

We measure identification with the President's party through the following survey item:

"In politics today, do you think of yourself as: Strongly Republican; Leaning toward Republican; Leaning toward Democrat; Strongly Democrat; Independent; Other." Responses were recoded so

³⁵ Daryn Kagan, "McCain Says Administration May Mislead Congress on Kosovo Involvement," *CNN Morning News*, October 7 1998.

³⁶ Berinsky, "Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict", Foyle, "Foreign Policy Analysis and Globalization: Public Opinion, World Opinion, and the Individual."

that Independents scored a value of 3, in the middle of the range, and “other” was coded as missing. Surprisingly, as Figure 3 illustrates, identification with the President’s party did not have a significant effect on support for humanitarian intervention at the bivariate level.

Media Coverage

The media are often perceived as playing a significant role in the formation of public opinion. In a classic work, Cohen categorises the press as observer, participant and catalyst.³⁷ As a catalyst, the media act as an international witness and allow the public to observe human tragedy almost in real time. When people watch refugees dying, children in pain, and communities destroyed, the viewing public might push their leaders to act. Goure argues that in the case of the US, the media have served as a catalyst to the extent that US interventions resembled “foreign policy for soccer moms.”³⁸ Schorr concurs to some extent, stating that international media coverage influences perceptions, public opinion and policy, creating an environment for “edge-of-seat diplomacy” where policy makers must make an effort to quell the images of people suffering.³⁹ According to this argument, leaders respond to public opinion to satisfy a particular constituency with intervention.⁴⁰

While the media are frequently portrayed as exerting a powerful impact on public opinion, several scholars argue that what is commonly referred to as the ‘CNN factor’ is exaggerated. Burk rejects the CNN thesis, arguing that in fact experts and foreign policy leaders provide the media with its information.⁴¹ In a similar vein, Powlick and Katz argue that public opinion is a “dog that could bark”; however, it must first be activated by elite debate and media coverage.⁴²

³⁷ Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

³⁸ Daniel Goure, "A Post-Clinton Foreign Policy," *World and I* 14, 9 (1999): 58.

³⁹ Daniel Schorr, "CNN Effect: Edge-of-Seat Diplomacy," *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 27 1998.

⁴⁰ See also: Walter Goodman, "How Much Did TV Shape Policy?," *New York Times*, December 8, 1992 and George F. Kennan, "Somalia, through a Glass Darkly," *New York Times*, September 30, 1993.

⁴¹ James Burk, "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis," *Political Science Quarterly* 114, Spring (1999): 53-78.

⁴² Philip Powlick and Andrew Katz, "Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus," *Mershon International Studies Review* 42, 1 (1998): 29-61.

Given that the relationship between the media and public opinion is the subject of much debate, we aimed to assess the relationship between attention to the media and support for peacekeepers in Kosovo. The PIPA survey asked respondents, “*As you may know, NATO is bombing Serb targets to pressure Yugoslav President Milosevic to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. How closely are you following the situation in Kosovo? (1) not at all closely; (2) not very closely; (3) somewhat closely; (4) very closely.*”⁴³ We test the following hypothesis:

H₅: As respondents’ attention to the media increases, their support for humanitarian intervention will also increase.

As Figure 4 demonstrates, at the bivariate level there is a significant though modest relationship between respondents’ attention to the media and support for humanitarian intervention, providing preliminary support for this hypothesis.

Risk Assessment

Scholars have also noted that public support for various types of foreign policy initiatives is contingent upon risk assessment. According to this view, the public is quite rational and weighs the potential benefits of a mission (e.g., providing food to refugees, protecting national interests) against the costs likely to be incurred (e.g., casualties, monetary contributions). Furthermore, a prudent public is also prone to consider the likelihood that a mission will be successful. After considering the benefits, costs, and potential for success, the public renders a positive or negative verdict for the mission at hand.

⁴³ Originally, responses were coded so that higher values corresponded to lower levels of attention paid to Kosovo. We have recoded these values for purposes of presentation.

Prior to 9/11, conventional wisdom held that Americans would not tolerate casualties.⁴⁴ Still, recent work has begun to question this accepted view. Kull and Ramsey found that while policy makers and the media frequently cite Americans' refusal to accept sustained casualties, actual polling data reveal a very different story.⁴⁵ Burk concurs, arguing that public support for intervention does not always depend upon the risk of casualties.⁴⁶ Feaver and Gelpi provide additional evidence that the public considers more than just casualties when forming opinions, finding that there is considerable tolerance for casualties in "high intensity realpolitik missions."⁴⁷ They conclude that the public is "defeat phobic, more than casualty phobic."⁴⁸

Feaver and Gelpi's work highlights the importance of a more crucial component of risk assessment – the likelihood of success. Public evaluations are not contingent solely on costs (such as casualties) but also on the objectives of the mission and its potential for success. Eichenburg provides empirical evidence supporting the importance of success in determining citizens' attitudes. In an expansive study of 22 cases in which the US contemplated, threatened or used force, he finds that the success or failure of the mission was crucial to understanding public support for military intervention.⁴⁹ Indeed, he found that the success or failure of a mission provided the necessary "context in which the impact of casualties must be understood."⁵⁰

⁴⁴ E. N. Luttwak, "Where Are the Great-Powers - at Home with the Kids," *Foreign Affairs* 73, 4 (1994): 23-28. John E. Mueller, "Policy Principles for Unthreatened Wealth-Seekers," *Foreign Policy* 102, Spring (1996): 31.

⁴⁵ Kull and Ramsay, "The Myth of the Reactive Public: American Public Attitudes on Military Fatalities in the Post-Cold War Period."

⁴⁶ J. Burk, "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis," *Political Science Quarterly* 114, 1 (1999): 53-78.

⁴⁷ Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles : American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004): 97.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Richard C. Eichenberg, "Victory Has Many Friends: US Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981-2005," *International Security* 30, 1 (2005): 140-77.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

The PIPA survey provides a ready operationalisation for the theory of risk assessment. The survey asked respondents “*If further bombing does not prove to be effective and NATO decides to intervene with ground troops how likely do you think it is that the operation will succeed at an acceptable cost? (1) not at all likely; (2) not too likely; (3) somewhat likely; (4) very likely.*” With this measure, we aim to test the following hypothesis:

H₆: As respondents perceive the likelihood of success as increasing, their support for peacekeeping will also increase.

As Figure 5 depicts, there is a strong and significant correlation between risk assessment and support for humanitarian intervention at the bivariate level. This provides preliminary evidence that the public does like a winner.

Historical Milieu

Finally, we turn now to a variable that has not been extensively studied in the literature – the impact of prior experiences with humanitarian intervention, or historical milieu. According to Lyon and Dolan, historical milieu can function “as the ‘lens’ through which previous events shape and inform the public and policy elite consciousness.”⁵¹ It is reasonable to expect that support for current operations might be coloured by recent episodes of success and failure. Jentleson dubs this the “halo effect” in which a recent successful military intervention can create the perception that future venues will garner the same success.⁵² Historical milieu may produce a rally effect, in that the sheen or success from a previous engagement inspires optimism about another engagement.

At the same time, after examining the recent record of global humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations, it seems that instead of a “halo,” there might be more of a “hangover

⁵¹ Lyon and Dolan, “American Humanitarian Intervention,” 50.

⁵² B. W. Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public - Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force,” *International Studies Quarterly* 36, 1 (1992): 49-74.

effect.”⁵³ While the major world powers were optimistic about humanitarian operations following the end of the Cold War, this optimism was tempered by a few debacles, which were difficult to get in to, tough to manage, and tougher to get out of. There is a growing understanding that such operations are complex endeavours and may not assist in conflict resolution. In fact, the recent success rate for such interventions is mixed. Cases such as Somalia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Haiti do not present pictures of success.⁵⁴ In some respects, these failures are a function of broadening ambitions, which have moved operations beyond the original mandates of supervising ceasefires into the area of conflict resolution and even governance.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the commitment to neutrality, lack of force and dedication to sovereignty often undermined these operations and resulted in the dawn of humanitarian interventions (or third-generation peacekeeping). Given the complex nature of these operations, success is frequently not a likely outcome.

In light of the growing evidence that humanitarian intervention missions do not always go smoothly, these “hiccups” may undermine public support for such operations.⁵⁶ Indeed, Kull notes, “many Americans are leery about contributing to international efforts,” when they are perceived as ineffective.⁵⁷ In the case of Bosnia in 1995, Kull cites an April 1995 PIPA poll that found 75% of Americans viewed the operations as “ineffective and even dangerous.”⁵⁸ If historical milieu does matter, then previous engagement in Bosnia seems like the most likely suspect for explaining support for operations in Kosovo three years later, due to its geographical

⁵³ In an examination of the United States, Jentleson has referred to this phenomenon as “Vietnam-taught risk aversion.”

⁵⁴ For example, the *Report of the Panel of the United Nations Peace Operations* (also known as the Brahimi Report) repeatedly calls for change in the administration of peacekeeping operations and acknowledges a decade of failure. Lakhdar Brahimi, “Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations.” (United Nations, 2000).

⁵⁵ UNMIK is an example of such mission expansion.

⁵⁶ V. P. Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War,” *International Studies Quarterly* 48, 2 (2004): 269-92.

⁵⁷ Steven Kull, “What the Public Knows That Washington Doesn’t,” *Foreign Policy* 101 (1995-96): 102-15.

⁵⁸ Kull, “What the Public Knows That Washington Doesn’t,” 105.

proximity and overlap of actors.⁵⁹ Indeed, some of the key actors in Bosnia were the same international organisations pushing for action in Kosovo, including the United Nations and NATO.⁶⁰

In measuring prior experiences with humanitarian intervention, it is imperative to focus on the public's perception of these operations, rather than objective indicators of success or failure. For example, if the goal is to determine individual levels of support for humanitarianism, it is imperative to ensure that measurement of prior experience with humanitarian intervention is also at the individual level. Individuals will vary substantially in their evaluations of past policy initiatives, therefore to account for such variation, one must ask individuals themselves to evaluate past humanitarian missions.

In the case of Kosovo, we determine whether Americans were influenced by images of either a "halo" or a "hangover" with the following survey question: *"Do you believe that sending US and other NATO forces to Bosnia has improved the chances of finding a way to permanently end the fighting there, or not? (1) yes, has improved chances or (0) no, has not improved chances."* We hypothesise that respondents who view the Bosnia mission more favorably will be more supportive of peacekeeping in Kosovo. Figure 6 provides some evidence for this hypothesis,

⁵⁹According to Eichenberg, American support for the Bosnian intervention was at 42% prior to engagement and actually rose four points during the intervention Ibid..

⁶⁰ It is important to note that the record of these two organisations differed sharply. In July 1995, the United Nations force's inaction in the town of Srebrenica made international headlines as UN 'safe areas' became execution sites for Bosnian men and boys. Several months later, a NATO led Implementation Force (I-FOR) replaced the UN force (UNPROFOR). PIPA surveys found that the Bosnia operation was viewed as successful as it progressed. In September 1997, only 27% perceived it as successful, whereas in March 1998, 49% believed that the operation had "improved the chances of finding a way to permanently end the fighting there."⁶⁰ In some respects, this presents a dual historical milieu, as the Bosnian legacy is mixed. In terms of the United Nations, the public perceptions are negative while NATO's operations are evaluated as more effective and successful. Alvin Richman, "U.S. Public's Views on Peacekeeping Missions: The Bosnia Case," *USIA Electronic Journal* 3, 2 (1998).

as it illustrates that there is a significant correlation between perceptions of the Bosnia mission and support for operations in Kosovo at the bivariate level.

To test whether historical milieu, along with the other variables highlighted here, can significantly predict public support for humanitarianism, we must test these variables in a multivariate model. While the bivariate analyses are useful for illustrating the relationships between each independent variable and the dependent variable, it is imperative to test these variables in multivariate models to ensure that the findings are robust. Our multivariate models also included variables to measure the socioeconomic status of respondents, as such factors are typically included in public opinion research.⁶¹

Multivariate Analyses

Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, we rely upon binomial logistic regression for this portion of the analysis. The dependent variable is measured through the following survey question: *“Some people feel that NATO should send ground troops into Kosovo at this point. Do you favor or oppose this idea? (1) favor; (0) oppose.”* It is important to remember that respondents answered this survey question approximately six weeks after the bombing campaign was initiated and approximately one month prior to the peace accords.⁶²

As Table 2 indicates, in most cases the variables measuring socioeconomic status are not significant predictors of support for humanitarian intervention in terms of support for

⁶¹ Age was measured according to the following categories: (1) 18 to 29 (2) 30 to 45 (3) 46 to 65 (4) Over 65. Respondents were asked to indicate their highest level of education: (1) Less than high school (no degree) (2) High school graduate (3) Some college (4) 4 year college degree (5) Advanced degree. The question measuring income read: *“Here is a range of household incomes. Just stop me when I read an amount that is more than the correct category for your household”* (1) \$15,000 (2) \$25,000 (3) \$45,000 (4) \$70,000 (5) \$100,000 (6) More than \$100,000. Sex of respondent was coded so that (1) men (0) women.

⁶² Our multivariate model is handicapped by the manner in which the data were collected, as many questions were asked of only half of the sample during the administration of the survey. Thus, it is not possible to include all of the variables together in the same model. While this is not ideal, we aim to circumvent this problem by including split sample variables separately.

peacekeepers; age is insignificant across the models, while education is significant only when included with the variable measuring the perception of strategic interest. Respondents' income also performs inconsistently, as it is significant in only three of the models. In those cases, wealthier respondents are more likely to support peacekeeping troops. In almost all cases, men were more supportive of peacekeeping troops than women. Respondents' sex is insignificant when included in the strategic interest model, yet in all other cases, men are more likely to support peacekeepers than women.

While the inclusion of the socioeconomic variables allows us to control for important characteristics, our main variables of theoretical concern are those measuring policy objectives, elite cues, attention to the media, likelihood of success and historical milieu. Interestingly, identification with the President's party was not a significant predictor of attitudes towards humanitarian intervention. In the multivariate models, partisanship was insignificant, as Republicans, Democrats, and Independents registered comparable levels of support for peacekeeping operations. These findings could be influenced by Clinton's domestic political troubles. During the Kosovo intervention, President Clinton had been embroiled in a series of scandals, leading to his eventual impeachment. Thus, his political standing was weakened, perhaps diluting the impact of his cues in support of American involvement in Kosovo. Before dismissing the importance of elite cues, however, it is imperative to provide a more stringent test of elite influence, perhaps one that measures support for the actual elite in question (i.e. President Clinton) rather than a more diffuse measure of identification with the elite's party. While such a measure is not available in our dataset, this does seem like a fruitful endeavour for future research.

Attention to the media also yielded surprising results, as it is significant only in Models 1 and 5. When other factors such as likelihood of success, perception of Bosnia, and humanitarian rationale for intervention are included in the models with the media variable, the effects of the media disappear.⁶³ We find it interesting that, at least in the tests here, media attention has only a mild impact on public attitudes. One possible interpretation of this finding is that the likelihood of success, perceptions of Bosnia, and humanitarian concerns outweigh any effect caused by the media. Still, it is important to recognise that the media could frame these other factors by highlighting the failures of a given intervention, or stressing the humanitarian need for a mission.

At the same time, we do find very strong support for the likelihood of success. As individuals view success as increasingly likely, they are more than twice as supportive of humanitarian engagement as those who perceive failure as imminent. Furthermore, as the Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared indicates, the model including the likelihood of success variable explains 34.7% of the variation in the dependent variable. This is quite substantial given our analysis is at the individual level; in terms of explaining variation in the dependent variable, this model outperforms the others.

Perceptions of Bosnia were also significantly linked to support for operations in Kosovo. Those who saw halos around this previous mission were 121% more likely to support efforts in Kosovo. While this variable is significant, the Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared indicates that this model explains far less of the variation in the dependent variable – only 9%. It appears that while previous experiences with humanitarian operations are significant, they are perhaps dwarfed by

⁶³Again, before one could completely dismiss the importance of the media, one would have to include the media variable in a fully specified multivariate model. While such a model is not possible given the confines of the data collection of this particular survey, it is imperative to test the effects of the media in subsequent analyses.

perceptions of success.⁶⁴ In addition, it is important to remember that while perceptions of Bosnia are closely tied to those of Kosovo, other peacekeeping missions outside of the Balkans (i.e. Somalia and Haiti) may also have an effect.

The principal policy objective of the mission was also significant in predicting support. Respondents who thought that the US had a moral justification for intervening in Kosovo were more than three times as likely to support the operation as those who did not. This model explains 16.2% of the variation in support. The variable strategic interest was also significant; the respective model explained 12.4% of the variance in support for the humanitarian intervention. Thus, in addition to attaining statistical significance, these variables also perform quite well in terms of the amount of variance they explain in the dependent variable.

⁶⁴ It is important to note that these two variables could be related. That is, perceptions of success are based upon the perceptions of past peacekeeping operations such as those in Bosnia. Unfortunately, we cannot test the relationship between these variables, as each question was asked of different portions of the sample.

Conclusions

This study of American public opinion and humanitarian intervention finds support for many of the variables highlighted in the literature. Overall, we find that the CNN thesis is exaggerated, that party affiliation is not a significant predictor of support,⁶⁵ and that the amount of media attention has an inconsistent impact on public attitudes. The key factors influencing public attitudes towards humanitarian intervention appear to be policy objectives, historical milieu, and the belief in operational success. Although we acknowledge that public opinion and humanitarian dynamics are complex, with these findings we can begin building a model to map the primary determinants of public attitudes towards humanitarian engagements.

The results concerning historical milieu are quite intriguing. They suggest that when assessing risk, respondents do not think solely in terms of the immediate costs and benefits of the mission at hand. Factors such as monetary cost, casualties, and likelihood of success of the present/proposed mission appear to be influenced by respondents' evaluations of what has happened in the past. In the case of Kosovo, previous missions in the region exerted a significant impact on respondents' support for operations in Kosovo.⁶⁶ Our results indicate that when formulating opinions on humanitarian interventions in the Sudan, for example, the public may evaluate the success of missions such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, as these latter operations have both been framed in humanitarian terms at different times.

⁶⁵ At the same time, we do want to acknowledge that a more specific question measuring allegiance with particular elites (e.g., Clinton and McCain) could yield different results. Our measure of elite influence was an indirect one, measuring identification with a particular party. Still, it is interesting that there were no visible party differences between Republicans and Democrats, particularly given that elites in each of these parties had distinct views on Kosovo and those views were expressed publicly.

⁶⁶ The relationship between risk assessment and historical milieu needs further exploration as the limitations of our data did not allow for a thorough examination of the relationships between these variables. To determine how generalisable this finding is, it will need to be tested in additional cases. In addition, further analysis is needed to determine if the geographic proximity is significant as well

There are additional alternative explanations for public support for humanitarian missions that also merit further exploration. In particular, the impact of multilateral versus unilateral operations deserves closer scrutiny. The literature suggests that multilateral operations tend to be viewed more favorably than unilateral ones, as the former share the costs of missions with other countries.⁶⁷ Moreover, as most humanitarian operations are multilateral endeavours, it is important to expand this analysis to other countries to determine if results from this American sample are applicable to other populations.

Another alternative explanation of support for humanitarian missions highlights the importance of the international organisation leading the effort. For example, is the public more supportive of a NATO versus a UN operation? Furthermore, would the impact of the sponsoring nation vary from country to country? Again, this alternative explanation is beyond the scope of this study, but opens an interesting venue for future research. When considering a humanitarian intervention in Sudan, for example, the support of allies and the inclusion of the United Nations may be important items in determining public support for such a commitment of force.

Our findings also indicate that the American public finds Wilsonian ideals appealing. While the strategic implications of intervention were significant, Americans also responded positively to intervention appeals framed on moral grounds. Almost 75% of Americans found moral arguments for intervention in Kosovo persuasive, and these individuals were significantly more likely to support intervention. This is consistent with recent polls indicating that strong support for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo is not a relic from the pre-9/11 years. A 2005 poll conducted on attitudes towards Sudan found that 84% of Americans believed that “the U.S.

⁶⁷ This variable could be of some importance; however, we were not able to test its relevance here, as our case selection held this variable constant -- Kosovo was a multilateral effort.

should not tolerate an extremist government committing such attacks and should use its military assets, short of putting U.S. troops on the ground, to help stop them.” There was strong support for the creation of a no-fly zone over Darfur (80%) as well as for the use of NATO involvement to provide logistical support for the African Union’s beleaguered peacekeeping force (76%).⁶⁸ A 2007 survey conducted by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs also found Americans strongly agreed that the United Nations Security Council has either the “responsibility” (48%) or the “right” (35%) to intervene in the domestic affairs of some countries, supporting “the use of military force to protect people from severe human rights violations, such as genocide, even against the will of their own government.” In addition, 65% of Americans polled supported contributing troops to a peacekeeping effort in Darfur.⁶⁹ Both the 2005 and 2007 polls found extensive support for the United States for play a leadership role in Sudan. Thus, “there would appear to be much greater public backing for America to play a leadership role in stemming this catastrophe than has been the conventional wisdom in Washington.”⁷⁰

While the American public appears to demonstrate consistent support for engagement in humanitarian crises like that of Sudan, the US government has been slow to act. This disconnect between public preferences and public policy could be due to a variety of factors, one of which could be the receptivity of elites to public opinion. The impact of public opinion on policy elites does appear to vary, as some administrations appear to be more sensitive and vulnerable to its qualities. At the same time, one is hard pressed to imagine a President committing troops in the

⁶⁸ International Crisis Group, "Do Americans Care About Darfur?," (Zogby International Opinion Survey, 2005). <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3492>

⁶⁹ Christopher Whitney and Steven Kull, "French and Americans Ready to Contribute Troops to Darfur Peacekeeping Operation," (The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2007). http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/media_press_room_detail.php?press_release_id=61

⁷⁰ International Crisis Group, "Do Americans Care About Darfur?."

name of humanitarianism without domestic public support. Thus, the significance of public opinion may wax and wane over time, yet, it remains an essential factor in creating and supporting American humanitarian initiatives. Given the increasing demands for humanitarian operations in places like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia (again), Nepal, Afghanistan and potentially Iraq, understanding the factors that propel a population to support international operations will remain important for decades to come.

Table 1: Potential Determinants of Public Attitudes towards Humanitarian Operations

Variables	Key Components
Policy Objectives	Strategic Interests Humanitarian Interests Domestic Political Interests
Elite Cues	Presidential/Congressional cues Elite Consensus/Disagreement
Media Factors	CNN Factor Level of Suffering Knowledge of Crisis
Risk Assessment	Causality Aversion Probability of Success Multilateral Supports Duration/Potential Monetary Costs
Historical Milieu	Halos or Hangovers (Perception)

Figure 1: Support for Humanitarian Intervention by Policy Objectives




Figure 2: Support for Humanitarian Intervention by Strategic Policy Objectives




Figure 3: Support for Humanitarianism by Partisanship




Figure 4: Support for Humanitarian Intervention by Attention to the Media




Figure 5: Support for Humanitarian Intervention by Likelihood of Success




Figure 6: Support for Humanitarian Intervention by Perceptions of Bosnia Mission




Table 2: Support for Humanitarian Intervention

Independent Variables	Model 1: Media and Party ID	Model 2: Success	Model 3: Bosnia	Model 4: Moral Reason for Intervention	Model 5: Strategic Interest
Constant	.177** (.540)	.013*** (1.021)	.113** (.859)	.052** (.878)	.083** (.878)
Age	.912 (.108)	.854 (.179)	.999 (.165)	.880 (.167)	.832 (.179)
Education	.907 (.095)	.934 (.161)	.908 (.142)	.961 (.144)	.779* (.146)
Income	1.159* (.076)	1.240* (.130)	1.121 (.117)	1.105 (.113)	1.352** (.121)
Sex	1.733** (.196)	1.802* (.325)	1.672* (.302)	2.142** (.292)	1.190 (.300)
Party Identification	1.053 (.073)	.927 (.127)	1.047 (.109)	1.041 (.110)	.984 (.117)
Attention to the Media	1.271* (.124)	1.087 (.209)	1.196 (.197)	1.271 (.198)	1.610* (.215)
Likelihood of Success		3.289*** (.189)			
Halo/Hangover			2.212** (.304)		
Moral Reason for Intervention				4.328*** (.400)	
Strategic Interest Reason for Intervention					2.023* (.332)
N	476	224	220	240	225
Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared	.049	.347	.090	.162	.124

This table reports odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses.
 All models are significant. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

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